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Abstract 
 
The present paper investigates the link between the shadow economy and FDI 
using the Granger panel causality test. For that purpose we use the shadow 
economy and FDI data for 145 countries of five data points 1999/2000, 
2001/2002, 2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005. The system GMM 
estimation results show that FDI causes the shadow economy and vice versa. 
The empirical evidence supports the hypotheses that higher FDI causes lower 
shadow economy and higher shadow economy causes higher FDI.  
JEL Classification: O17, F21, C33 
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1. Introduction 
The shadow economy is a phenomenon known throughout the world. It exists, 
especially, when governments apply excessive tax or unreasonably regulate economic 
activities. The shadow economy is a non-negligible part of economic activity whose 
economic volume occupies as much as 10 to 50 percent of the economy and without 
consideration of this important sector, it is impossible to evaluate the consequences of 
various economic policies. This is a particularly serious obstacle in developing 
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countries. Knowledge of the shadow economy will lead to a better understanding of 
the market system and hopefully to better economic policies.  
There is a large literature on the different methods of measurement of the shadow 
economy and a good review and criticism of them can be found in Lackó (1999), 
Schneider and Enste (2000) and Schneider (2005). 
The hidden nature of shadow economy makes it difficult to measure and study. 
That is why a majority of commonly used methods take use of indirect estimation. 
Such methods involve many restrictive hypotheses. There are three major methods for 
measurement of the size of shadow economy: 
1. The methods based on microeconomic theories (Direct Approaches) 
2. The methods based on macroeconomic theories (Indirect Approaches) 
3. The Model Approach (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes, MIMIC) 
There is a large body of literature
5
 on the possible causes and indicators of the shadow 
economy. In almost all studies
6
 it has been ascertained that the overall tax and social 
security contribution burdens are among the main causes for the existence of the 
shadow economy but in most of these studies, tax burden is considered nationally and 
the effects of tax avoidance in a global scale is not mentioned.  
In fact, capital’s ability to cross borders without restriction has left nationally 
based tax systems struggling to protect themselves from tax avoidance. The rise of the 
tax avoidance industry has coincided with a trend towards using tax competition as a 
strategy for attracting inwards investment, with widespread use of export processing 
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zones, tax holidays, accelerated depreciation rates, fiscal subsidies and preferential tax 
terms.  So tax competition has led to many governments cutting tax rates on income 
earned by non-residents in order to attract portfolio and foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  
Faced with this threat to their tax revenues, governments have increasingly 
resorted to shifting the tax burden from capital to labor, despite this being in most 
instances both regressive and counter-productive from an employment creation 
perspective. Therefore, shifting tax burden from capital to labor and consumption to 
attract FDI, induce them towards the shadow economy activities. This is the views of 
those who focused on the dark side of FDI.  Against this view, there are those who 
look on the bright side of FDI and argue that it affects economic growth and 
government tax revenues positively in a variety of ways and ultimately decrease the 
shadow economy. 
On the other hand, not only the economic, but also the political system affects the 
shadow economic activities. In an inefficient state where corruption is rampant the 
citizens will have little trust in the authority and thus a low incentive to be active in 
the formal economy. Recent studies show that countries with high level of corruption 
have a higher share of shadow economy. The large body of literature on the 
relationship between corruption and FDI has suggested that the relationship is 
theoretically ambiguous; therefore how shadow economy affects FDI is also 
ambiguous. 
Although the casual relationship between shadow economy and FDI is important 
for economic policies, it has received less attention and there is no empirical study on 
this issue. In this paper we aim at filling this gap using recent causality methods 
developed for panel data (Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)). 
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2. Relative Literatures and Hypotheses   
In this section we explore the relationship between the shadow economy and FDI and 
formulate concrete hypotheses. We thereby combine two strands of the literature. The 
first deals with the impact of FDI on the shadow economy; the second with the 
influence of the shadow economy on FDI. In both strands there are important gaps. 
2.1. The Impacts of FDI on Shadow Economy  
The scale of tax avoidance activity can be described as a shadow economy operating 
in the majority of globalizes sectors (Christensen and Kapoor, 2004). The 
multinational enterprise (MNE) is the embodiment of globalization and its principal 
agent. MNEs are the “face” of globalization which offers the ability to create value-
adding activities that can improve national competitiveness, thereby contributing to 
economic growth and national welfare (Eden, 1995). MNEs also generate FDI flows 
(Gorgodze, 2004). 
In the mid-1980s and 1990s, MNE state relations shifted from confrontation to 
cooperation. Governments moved from regulating to encouraging entry, from taxing 
to subsidizing, from opposition to FDI to partnership with multinationals (Murtha and 
Lenway, 1994). 
At the end of the 1990s, Vernon (1998) argued that the current calm period in 
MNE-state relations was the “eye in the hurricane”. Some authors predict that this 
period of calm is now ending, as globalization creates a backlash in the OECD 
countries against multinationals and international organizations (Graham, 2000; 
Rodrik, 1997; Rugman, 2000; Vernon, 1998). Thus, the multinational enterprise is 
Janus, the two faced -dark and bright- symbol of globalization (Eden and Lenway, 
2001).  
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      Those who focus on the dark side of the MNE, argue that when a MNE undertakes 
FDI, it does so through a two stage process. First, the MNE researches several 
possible locations and narrows its focus to a handful of potential sites. Then these 
potential locations bid against one another by offering firm-specific tax reductions and 
other incentives to the firm to ensure that they become the host (Davies, 2005). 
The rise of the tax avoidance industry has coincided with a trend towards using 
tax competition as a strategy for attracting inwards investment, with widespread use 
of export processing zones, accelerated depreciation rates, fiscal subsidies, 
preferential tax terms and tax havens (Christensen and Kapoor, 2004). Tax havens 
share a number of defining characteristics, most importantly low or zero tax rates on 
offer to non-residents and transaction secrecy (Tanzi, 2000). A low rate in itself is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for a tax haven (Killian, 2006)
7
. 
The logic of  tax competition requires either that all businesses must move 
offshore in order to compete on a level basis, or that onshore tax authorities adjust 
their tax regimes to place a greater burden on other factors of production (particularly 
labor) and onto consumption, as has been the trend in many countries for the past
8
.  
Capital’s ability to cross borders without restriction has left nationally based tax 
systems struggling to protect themselves from tax avoidance by high net worth 
individuals and profits-laundering by transnational businesses. At the same time tax 
competition has led to many governments cutting tax rates on income earned by non-
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residents in order to attract portfolio and foreign direct investment. Faced with this 
dual threat to their tax revenues, governments in developed and developing countries 
have increasingly resorted to shifting the tax burden from capital to labor, despite this 
being in most instances both regressive and counter-productive from an employment 
creation perspective. So tax competition between states can be economically harmful 
in a number of ways: 
1- Tax competition shifts the tax burden between different factors of            
production and between different types of economic activity, thereby increasing 
the costs of labor in relation to capital and encouraging short term speculative 
activity to the detriment of fixed, long-term investment; 
2- The greater mobility of high net worth individuals and MNEs enables them to 
make full use of offshore tax vehicles, thereby undermining the integrity and 
equity of tax structures and creating a free-rider economy; 
3- The use of elaborate and typically aggressive tax avoidance structures increases 
the administrative burden of revenue collection; and 
4- Widespread tax evasion and avoidance increases income disparities within and 
between nation states, and is symptomatic of the withdrawal of wealthy elites 
from their economic and social obligations. 
Tax competition and tax havens reduce tax revenues that could otherwise contribute 
to public services, development, and the reduction of poverty (Lewis, 2006). 
In a world where there are taxes on international transactions or where the rates of 
business income taxation differ across countries, then a multinational enterprise has 
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financial incentives to choose strategically a transfer price9 to reduce the amount of 
taxation paid in the importing and exporting countries.  
Another action to be taken in response to changes in tax rates is to manage 
earnings levels across accounting periods to minimize the tax liability of the firm 
through time. When tax rates are known to be reduced, firms are motivated to 
decelerate the recognition of income. This phenomenon, often called earnings 
management or income smoothing has been extensively studied through the late 
1980s and1990s, particularly in the context of the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(Killian, 2006). 
In conclusion, the recent wave of MNEs has been directed towards countries 
offering a suit of incentives through tax competition to attract FDI categorized as tax 
havens. Although tax havens offer low or zero tax rates to MNEs, they adjust their tax 
regimes to place a grater burden on other factors of production especially labor and 
consumption and induce them towards shadow activities. On the other hand, MNEs 
tend to take more advantages through tax havens by managing earning and transfer 
pricing so shadow economy increases in these countries. In summary we expect: 
             Hypothesis 1: Higher FDI causes higher shadow economy.  
On the other hand, those who look on the bright side of MNEs, argue that FDI 
affects government tax revenues positively in a variety of ways. For example, higher 
investment levels in a country are expected to increase production, thus directly 
increasing domestic taxes on income, and on goods and services if the production is 
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sold in the country, and indirectly through increases in the quantity and perhaps 
quality of domestic income that result in higher levels of income taxes if it is sold 
abroad. Part of the production inputs could also be imported, thus again constituting a 
potential increase in taxes on international trade. Furthermore, as it is also argued that 
FDI will foster greater activity in the domestic firms participating in the production 
chain, and thus, expected higher productivity of these firms provide an additional 
channel through which tax revenues are expected to increase. Of course the above 
analysis is dependent on the type of FDI, the sector where is it embedded, and the 
potential externalities that are expected to generate, but the overall effect is generally 
expected to be positive. In sum it is argued that FDI motivates the tax system reform 
in a way that it causes tax evasion reduction. Then it is expected that by increasing 
FDI, the shadow economy decreases.  
But even if the above effects have been theoretically analyzed, the empirical work 
on the effect of FDI on shadow economy is almost nonexistent, and thus its direction 
and magnitude still unreported. The only exception is the working paper of Vacaflores 
(2006), who studies the impact of FDI on tax revenue in Latin America during 1980-
2002, by estimating the dynamic panel model with system GMM. He finds that FDI 
has a positive effect on central government tax revenues. 
      Hypothesis 2: Higher FDI causes lower shadow economy. 
2.2. The Impacts of Shadow Economy on FDI  
The present authors are unaware of any studies on the issue of relationship between 
shadow economy and FDI. This paper therefore seeks to address this very issue. It 
will do so by linking the theme of shadow economy to corruption that has been 
playing an important role in attracting FDI. 
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       Studies have indicated that political system can affects formal and informal 
economic activities. Torgler and Schneider (2007) find strong support that governance 
and institutional quality increase leads to a smaller shadow economy. If citizens 
perceive that their interests (preferences) are properly represented in political 
institutions and they receive an adequate supply of public goods, their identification 
with the state increases, their willingness to contribute increases.  
On the other hand, in an inefficient state where corruption is rampant the citizens 
will have little trust in the authority and thus a low incentive to cooperate. A 
sustainable tax system is based on a fair tax system and responsive government, 
achieved with a strong connection between tax payments and the supply of public 
goods (Bird et al., 2006). Friedman et al. (2000) show empirically that countries with 
more corruption have a higher share of unofficial economy. Dreher and Schneider 
(2006) have also investigated the correlation between shadow economy and 
corruption. They observe the tendency that shadow economy and corruption are 
substitutes in high-income countries, but complements in low-income countries.  
In countries where corruption is systemic and the government budget lacks 
transparency and accountability the obligation of paying taxes cannot be assumed to 
be an accepted social norm. Institutional instability, lack of transparency and rule of 
law undermine the willingness of frustrated citizens to be active in the formal 
economy. Citizens will feel cheated if they believe that corruption is widespread, their 
tax burden is not spent well, their government lacks accountability, and that they are 
not protected by the rules of law. This increases the incentive to enter the informal 
sector. Thus an increase in corruption increases the size of shadow economy. 
The relationship between corruption - which increases shadow economy- and 
FDI, should be observed by making use of data on FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
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did not find a significant correlation between the size of FDI and the host country's 
risk factor - which included corruption among other variables and was highly 
correlated with corruption. Another insignificant finding is reported by Alesina and 
Weder (1999).  
More recent studies provide evidence in favor of corruption deterring foreign 
investors. Focusing on bilateral flows between 14 sources and 45 host countries in 
1990 and 1991, Wei (2000a) detects a significant negative impact of corruption on 
FDI. Aizenman and Spiegel (2003) reveal a negative impact of corruption, measured 
by the BI-data, on the ratio of FDI to total capital accumulation for a variety of 
regressions.  
 Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000) show an adverse impact of corruption on FDI 
for the African countries. Abed and Davoodi (2002) obtain a negative impact of 
corruption on the US-Dollar per capita value of FDI for a cross-section of 24 
transition countries. Doh and Teegen (2003) show that investments in the 
telecommunications industry are adversely affected by the extent of corruption. 
 Smarzynska and Wei (2000) provide evidence in a similar vein for corruption to 
reduce firm-level assessments of FDI in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
In another study, Wei (2000b) and Wei and Wu (2001) also hint at corruption 
reducing foreign direct investments.  
Habib and Zurawicki (2001; 2002) also provide evidence in the line of corruption 
deterring foreign direct investments. They found that the impact of corruption on FDI 
to be larger than that on local investment.  
But FDI represent only a minor fraction of a country's total capital inflows. In 
order to ascertain the negative welfare consequences of corruption, it is vital to prove 
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its adverse effect on total capital inflows. The impact of corruption on these total net 
capital imports is proven in Lambsdorff (2003). In a cross-section of 65 countries, 
corruption is shown to decrease capital inflows at a 99 % confidence level. 
      Hypothesis 3: Higher shadow economy causes lower FDI. 
On the other hand, in some cases, foreign investors use illegitimate means to 
“persuade” governments to allow them to invest. Bribery is also common when 
foreign companies are only prepared to invest if they can secure special privileges. 
Corrupt governments make agreements with foreign firms, which allow the firms to 
do business on very favorable terms, often to the economic disadvantage of the local 
population. Foreign direct investment often involves contracts in which the foreign 
investor gains the profits and the government bears the risk (Anti Corruption 
Resource Center, ACRC).  In Addition, by increasing corruption and shadow 
economy, government revenues decreases –citizen don’t contribute to pay tax – then 
for compensating budget deficit, government attract FDI by giving privilege to 
foreign investors.  Egger and Winner (2005) empirically find a clear positive relation 
between corruption and FDI for a sample of 73 countries and time period 1995-1999.  
             Hypothesis 4: Higher shadow economy causes higher FDI. 
3. Empirical Model, Methodology and the Data  
3.1. Model  
The empirical model is aimed at investigating the Granger Casual relationship 
between shadow economy and FDI using dynamic panel system GMM estimators. 
Thus, the empirical model that employed in the analysis is as follows:  
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Where the causality-based variables x  and y  are FDI or shadow economy. We 
use three major control variables ( z ) as mediators between shadow economy and FDI 
including economic growth, economic freedom and institutional quality.   
Although the review of recent literature shows that the relationship between 
shadow economy and economic growth is ambiguous, Nikopour et al. (2008) by using 
Kuznet’s curve and data for 21 selected OECD countries for time period 1995-2006 
empirically show that there is a positive relationship between shadow economy and 
economic growth. On the other hand, the empirical studies show that there is a bi-
directional causality between FDI and economic growth and this relationship is 
positive (Chowdhury and Mavrotas, 2005).  
Using different restrictions on economic activities by government, financial, 
labor, trade and investment markets and also property rights causes economic freedom 
decreasing and force peoples and firms towards shadow economy activities. On the 
other hand, increasing economic freedom by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and 
liberalizing domestic financial system, increases FDI. 
The importance of institutional quality factor has caught the attention of 
economists in a variety of fields. North (1990) defines institutions as the human 
constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They comprise 
both formal rules (property rights, constitutions and laws) and informal constraints 
(unwritten taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct). When the rules change 
persistently or are not respected, when corruption is widespread and rule enforcement 
is fragile, or when property rights are not well defined, there is likely to be a problem 
with the quality of the institutions. Since the allocation of resources, the delivery of 
services and fair judgment will be less than desirable and the actual achievements will 
be less than the supposed aims. Problems related to institutional quality may be 
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translated into an increased degree of uncertainty that sends misleading signals to the 
market, thus affecting the productive economic process (Law and Azman-Saini, 
2008).  
3.2. Econometric Methodology  
In this paper, Granger-causality tests will be performed with panel data, which present 
a problem associated with dynamic panel data analyses. The general dynamic 
relationship is characterized by the presence of lagged regressors, which include apart 
from the causality-based variables ( x and y ) and additional control variables ( z ): 

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Where Tt ,...,1=  is time and Ni ,...1= is cross section and m , n  and r are the 
number of lags. It is assumed that the itu  follow a one-way error component model: 
ittiit vu ++= λµ                                                                 (2) 
Where ( )2,0~ µσµ IIDi  is the unobserved country-specific effect, 
( )2,0~ λσλ IIDt  represents period-specific effects and ( )2,0~ vit IIDv σ  the error term.  
The dynamic panel data regressions described in (1) and (2) are characterized by two 
sources of persistence over time, Autocorrelation due to the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors and individual effects characterizing the 
heterogeneity among the individuals. Since ity  is a function of iµ , it follows that 1, −tiy  
is also a function of iµ . Therefore, 1, −tiy , a right-hand regressor in (1) is correlated 
with the error term. This renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the 
itv  are not serially correlated. 
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In panel estimation, neither the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator nor 
the Fixed Effect (FE) estimator will produce consistent estimates in the presence of 
dynamics and endogenous regressors (Baltagi 1995). Arellano and Bond (1991) have 
proposed a dynamic panel General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator which is an 
IV estimator that uses all past values of endogenous regressors as well as current 
values of strictly exogenous regressors as instruments. Estimates can be based on first 
difference, or on orthogonal deviations.  
Arellano- Bond estimation starts by transforming all regressors, usually by 
differencing, and uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen 1982), and so is 
called Difference GMM. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments 
Arellano-Bond by making an additional assumption, that first differences of 
instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the 
introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a 
system of two equations-the original equation as well as the transformed one- and is 
known as System GMM. It is preferred to difference GMM since finite sample bias 
problem caused by weak instruments in first differenced GMM will be addressed by 
using system GMM. It also offers forward orthogonal deviations, an alternative to 
differencing that preserves sample size in panels with gaps. And it allows finer control 
over the instrument matrix.   
Both Difference GMM and System GMM are general estimators designed for 
situations with 1) “small T, large N" panels, meaning few time periods and many 
individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side variable that 
is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent variables that are 
not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current realizations 
of the error; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
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within individuals but not across them. Arellano and Bond proposed two estimators -
one- and two-step estimators- with the two-step estimator being the optimal estimator.  
The Sargan/Hansen test of over- identifying restrictions is performed which is a joint 
test of model specification and appropriateness of the instrument.   
 The test of whether x  Granger-causes y  consists of a test of the hypothesis that 
nβββ === ...21  are equal to zero (Wald test) after controlling for 
,y s own lags and 
the influence of additional controls ( z ). 
3.3. Data 
Until few years ago, quantitative analyses of interactions between variables such as 
shadow economy, indexes of rule of law, corruption and economic freedom have been 
virtually impossible. Fortunately, the recent availability of data on the scope of 
shadow economy now makes such a study possible. In particular, we refer to 
Schneider’s (2005, 2007) estimates of the shadow economy as percentage of official 
GDP. The collected data set consists of five data points (1999/2000, 2001/2002, 
2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005) for 145 countries
10
.  
The Heritage Foundation has provided economic freedom index since 1995. The 
index of economic freedom conceive uses 10 specific freedoms; (i) Business freedom, 
(ii) Trade freedom, (iii) Fiscal freedom, (iv) Government size, (v) Monetary freedom,  
(vi) Investment freedom, (vii) Financial freedom, (viii) Property rights, (ix) Freedom 
from corruption and (x) Labor freedom (Beach and Kane, 2008). The definition of the 
above economic freedom indicators are provided in Table 2 (Appendix). Since labor 
freedom is available only for recent years and not for the time period used in this 
paper, we used average of these nine indicators as an Economic Freedom. It is 
                                                 
10
 - The Definition of indicators is shown in Appendix (Table 2) and the list of countries in the sample 
is shown in Appendix (Table 5). 
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expected that the activities of the shadow economy decrease and FDI increase with 
increasing economic freedom. 
The institutional quality data sets we employed in the analysis are newly 
assembled dataset by Kaufmann et al. (2008). These indicators are constructed based 
on information gathered through a wide variety of cross-country surveys as well as 
polls of experts. Kaufmann et al. (2008) use a model of unobserved components, 
which enables them to achieve levels of coverage of approximately 212 countries for 
each of their indicators. They construct six different indicators, each representing a 
different dimension of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability, (ii) Political Stability 
and Lack of Violence, (iii) Government Effectiveness, (iv)Regulatory Quality, (v) Rule 
of Law, and (vi) Control of Corruption. The definition of the above institutional 
quality indicators are provided in Table 2 (Appendix). Because of collinearity 
between theses indicators, we defined average of voice and accountability, and 
political stability as the Political Freedom and Stability and average of government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption as the Government 
Efficiency. We expect an increase in governance and institutional quality reduces the 
size of the shadow economy and increase FDI.  
4. The Empirical Results 
We explore the Granger causality between shadow economy and FDI using two step 
system GMM method with t-values and test statistics that are asymptotically robust to 
general heteroscedasticity and corrected for a small sample bias.  
The estimates of the shadow economy equations are presented in Table 3a which 
its columns present different specifications of the shadow economy equation. In all 
models the variable of interest is FDI.   
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In specification (1), no control variable is used while in specification (2), GDP 
growth rate is used as a control variable. In specification (3), economic freedom 
variable is added to GDP growth rate as another control variable and in specification 
(4) indicator of political freedom and stability is added to GDP growth rate as the 
other control variable and finally in specification (5) the government efficiency 
indicator is added to GDP growth rate as a control variable.  
All models include a set of year dummies. In all specifications, year dummies and 
levels equation are used as instrument variables because all other regressors are not 
strictly exogenous. The shadow economy equation fits the data well as indicated by 
the regression statistics.  
Two types of diagnostic test are used for the empirical models. Firstly we 
conducted the test of first and second order serial correlation in the residuals. The   
AR (2) test statistics of the residuals do not reject the specification of the error term in 
all models except for model (1). Secondly, the Hansen test statistics indicate that the 
shadow economy equation for all specifications is well specified and that the 
instrument vector is appropriate. Test statistics also reject the null hypothesis that the 
time dummies are jointly equal to zero at the one percent level.  
The results suggest that there is no significant relationship between FDI and the 
shadow economy except for model (2) in which FDI has a negative significant impact 
on shadow economy. The economic growth rate in all specifications has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the shadow economy. In specifications 3-5 economic 
freedom, political freedom and stability and government efficiency have a statistically 
significant negative effect on the shadow economy respectively.  
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The Granger causality test (Wald test) is used for specification (2) since only in 
that FDI has a statistically significant impact on shadow economy. The result of this 
test suggests that FDI causes shadow economy. That is, past information on FDI help 
improve prediction of the shadow economy. Thus, the empirical evidence supports the 
second hypothesis that higher FDI causes lower shadow economy although this result 
is not robust.   
For double robustness checks, we drop outlier the shadow economy data – 
countries their shadow economy is more than 60% of GDP
11
. The results in Table 3b 
confirm the above mentioned results. 
The different specification estimates of FDI equation are presented in Table 4a. 
All models are specified the same as shadow economy equation and the variable of 
interest is shadow economy. All models include a set of year dummies. In all 
specifications, only year dummies and levels equation are used as instrument 
variables because all other regressors are not strictly exogenous. The FDI equation fits 
the data well as indicated by regression statistics.  
The AR (2) test statistics of the residuals do not reject the specification of the 
error term in all models. The Hansen test statistics also indicate that the FDI equation 
in all specifications is well specified and the instrument vector is appropriate. Test 
statistics also reject the null hypothesis that the time dummies are jointly equal to zero 
at one percent level.  
The results suggest that in all specifications, shadow economy has a statistical 
significant positive effect on FDI. Although in specifications 2-5, economic growth 
rate has a positive effect on FDI, only in specifications 3 and 5 this positive effect is 
statistically significant. In specifications 3-5 economic freedom, political freedom and 
                                                 
11
 - These countries including: Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Georgia, Panama, Peru, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
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stability and government efficiency have a positive effect on FDI respectively 
although only government efficiency is statistically significant in specification 5.  
The results of the Granger causality test (Wald test) suggest that shadow economy 
causes FDI in all models. That is, past information on shadow economy help improve 
prediction of FDI. Thus, the empirical evidence supports the fourth hypothesis that 
higher shadow economy causes higher FDI.  
For double robustness checks, we drop outlier the shadow economy data – 
countries their shadow economy is more than 60% of GDP- and added three extra 
control variables including labor force, human capital and capital formation 
(investment). The results in Table 4b confirm the above mentioned results. 
6. Conclusion 
The present paper examines the link between shadow economy and FDI using the 
Granger panel causality test. To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates 
the relationship between these two variables. For that purpose we use the shadow 
economy and FDI data for 145 countries of five data points 1999/2000, 2001/2002, 
2002/2003, 2003/2004 and 2004/2005.  
In this way we thereby combine two strands of the literature. The first deals with 
the impact of FDI on the shadow economy; the second with the influence of the 
shadow economy on FDI. In both strands there are important gaps. In this study we 
formulate four hypotheses: 
       Hypothesis 1: Higher FDI causes higher shadow economy.  
       Hypothesis 2: Higher FDI causes lower shadow economy. 
       Hypothesis 3: Higher shadow economy causes lower FDI. 
       Hypothesis 4: Higher shadow economy causes higher FDI. 
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The system GMM results support that FDI causes the shadow economy and vice 
versa. That is, past information on FDI help improve prediction of shadow economy 
and vice versa. Although the empirical evidence supports the robustness of fourth 
hypothesis, the second hypothesis that higher FDI causes lower shadow economy is 
not robust. Since FDI represent only a minor fraction of country’s economy, this 
causality is not robust.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Characteristics of sample data  
Variable Source 
Unit of 
Measurement Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Obs. 
Shadow Economy  Schneider (2007) US$,Billion 73.63 158.25 0.060 1379.6 704 
FDI  UNCTAD US$,Billion 5.48 18.07 -21.15 298.84 715 
Economic Growth  IMF % 7.81 4.77 -12.93 43.04 703 
Economic Freedom  
Heritage 
Foundation 
% 60.01 10.30 23.96 90.06 640 
Government Effectiveness  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation 
50.35 27.87 1.65 100 723 
Control of Corruption  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation 
48.69 28.22 0.24 100 720 
Voice and Accountability  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation 
49.34 27.55 2.16 100 725 
Political Stability  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation 
45.59 27.74 0.24 99.75 710 
Rule of Law  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation 
47.78 27.88 0.71 100 722 
Regulatory Quality  
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008) 
Standard 
deviation 
50.04 27.51 0.97 99.76 720 
Labor Force WDI Person 2.02e+7 7.40e+7 35853.3 7.70+e8 695 
Human Development 
Index(HDI) 
  UNDP 0-1 0.681 0.198 0.129 0.967 680 
Gross Capital Formation 
(Investment) 
WDI % of GDP 22.37 7.14 3.27 59.09 675 
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Table 2: Definition of Indicators  
Indicators 
 
Definition 
Shadow economy  The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: to avoid or evasion 
payment of income, value added or other taxes, to avoid payment of social security 
contributions, to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum 
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and  to avoid complying with certain 
administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative 
forms. 
Governance Indicators   
Voice and Accountability  The extent to which country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
Political Stability  The perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism 
Government Effectiveness  The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies 
Regulatory Quality  The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development 
Rule of Law  The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence 
Corruption  The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests 
Economic freedom  Encompasses all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption of goods and 
services. 
Business freedom The ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise quickly and easily. Burdensome, 
redundant regulatory rules are the most harmful barriers to business freedom. 
Trade freedom A composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and 
exports of goods and services. 
Fiscal freedom A measure of the burden of government from the revenue side. It includes both the tax burden 
in terms of the top tax rate on income (individual and corporate separately) and the overall 
amount of tax revenue as a portion of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Government size Defined to include all government expenditures, including consumption and transfers. Ideally, 
the state will provide only true public goods, with an absolute minimum of expenditure. 
Monetary freedom Combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price controls. Both inflation and 
price controls distort market activity. Price stability without microeconomic intervention is the 
ideal state for the free market. 
Investment freedom An assessment of the free flow of capital, especially foreign capital. 
Financial freedom A measure of banking security as well as independence from government control. State 
ownership of banks and other financial institutions such as insurer and capital markets is an 
inefficient burden, and political favoritism has no place in a free capital market. 
Property rights An assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear 
laws that are fully enforced by the state. 
Freedom from corruption Based on quantitative data that assess the perception of corruption in the business environment, 
including levels of governmental legal, judicial, and administrative corruption. 
Labor freedom A composite measure of the ability of workers and businesses to interact without restriction by 
the state. 
Sources: Schneider (2007), Beach and Kane (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
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Table 3a: Effect of FDI on shadow economy, two step system GMM estimation 
Dependent variable: ( )tshadowlog  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
( ) 1log −tshadow  0.989 
(52.09)* 
0.998 
(194.4)* 
0.999 
(151.18)* 
0.991 
(159.19)* 
0.996 
(190.28)* 
( ) 1log −tFDI  -0.008 
(-1.04) 
-0.006 
(-2.12)** 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.0009 
(0.20) 
-0.0003 
(-0.10) 
( )tgGDPlog   0.078 
(8.89)* 
0.068 
(5.65)* 
0.067 
(6.24)* 
0.063 
(6.50)* 
teedomeconomicfr )log(    
-0.147 
(-2.04)** 
  
( )tstabilityreedompoliticalf &log     -0.021 
(-1.76)*** 
 
tefficincygovernment )log(      
-0.023 
(-2.62)* 
)2002/2001(DUM  0.074 
(10.36)* 
0.053 
(13.18)* 
0.057 
(11.77)* 
0.058 
(11.76)* 
0.059 
(14.15)* 
)2003/2002(DUM  0.015 
(4.12)* 
0.044 
(11.30)* 
0.043 
(6.90)* 
0.042 
(9.83)* 
0.042 
(9.37)* 
)2004/2003(DUM   
0.008 
(4.35)* 
0.008 
(2.84)* 
0.007 
(3.80)* 
0.007 
(3.43)* 
cons−  0.084 
(1.37) 
-0.104 
(-4.03)* 
0.521 
(1.66)*** 
0.024 
(0.33) 
0.025 
(0.50) 
Number of observation 549 536 489 532 536 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value) 0.803 0.003 0.012 0.002 0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value) 0.043 0.145 0.509 0.431 0.476 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value) 0.596 0.232 0.218 0.209 0.231 
Wald test ( )0)log(: 10 =−tFDIH   (4.48)**    
Wald test ( )0:0 =DUMH  (64.51)* (97.97)* (89.14)* (127.48)* (117.01)* 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
average of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption. 
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Table 3b: Effect of FDI on shadow economy, two step system GMM estimation 
(Robustness Checks) 
Dependent variable: ( )tshadowlog  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
( ) 1log −tshadow  0.993 
(62.44)* 
0.999 
(204.04)* 
0.999 
(145.06)* 
0.993 
(153.79)* 
0.997 
(184.46)* 
( ) 1log −tFDI  -0.012 
(-1.79)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.23)** 
0.00009 
(0.01) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
( )tgGDPlog   0.078 
(8.96)* 
0.067 
(5.43)* 
0.069 
(6.46)* 
0.063 
(6.89)* 
teedomeconomicfr )log(    
-0.136 
(-1.75)*** 
  
( )tstabilityreedompoliticalf &log     -0.018 
(-1.52) 
 
tefficincygovernment )log(      
-0.022 
(-2.83)* 
)2002/2001(DUM  0.075 
(11.34)* 
0.054 
(13.18)* 
0.058 
(10.79)* 
0.059 
(11.52)* 
0.061 
(14.25)* 
)2003/2002(DUM  0.015 
(4.32)* 
0.045 
(11.56)* 
0.043 
(7.27)* 
0.044 
(10.47)* 
0.043 
(9.63)* 
)2004/2003(DUM   
0.008 
(4.41)* 
0.008 
(2.87)* 
0.008 
(4.24)* 
0.007 
(3.52)* 
cons−  0.070 
(1.34) 
-0.105 
(-4.44)* 
0.477 
(1.40) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.018 
(0.40) 
Number of observation 521 512 465 508 512 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value) 0.669 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value) 0.019 0.155 0.647 0.390 0.475 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value) 0.543 0.298 0.230 0.197 0.238 
Wald test ( )0)log(: 10 =−tFDIH   (4.99)**    
Wald test ( )0:0 =DUMH  (144.84)* (95.58)* (80.70)* (112.29)* (110.25)* 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
average of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption. 
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Table 4a: Effect of shadow economy on FDI, two step system GMM estimation 
Dependent variable: ( )tFDIlog  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
( ) 1log −tFDI  0.548 
(3.84)* 
0.568 
(5.04)* 
0.498 
(6.07)* 
0.702 
(4.39)* 
0.540 
(4.14)* 
( ) 1log −tshadow  0.535 
(2.93)* 
0.561 
(3.00)* 
0.579 
(4.72)* 
0.395 
(2.06)** 
0.462 
(2.40)** 
( )tgGDPlog   0.052 
(0.34) 
0.305 
(2.60)** 
0.333 
(3.67)* 
0.077 
(0.51) 
teedomeconomicfr )log(    
1.372 
(1.47) 
  
( )tstabilityreedompoliticalf &log     0.282 
(1.21) 
 
tefficincygovernment )log(      
0.455 
(1.96)*** 
)2002/2001(DUM  -0.219 
(-2.30)** 
-0.276 
(-3.34)* 
-0.271 
(-2.75)* 
-0.272 
(-3.43)* 
-0.302 
(-3.63)* 
)2003/2002(DUM  -0.161 
(-2.22)** 
-0.192 
(-1.78)*** 
  
-0.179 
(-1.75)*** 
)2004/2003(DUM  -0.054 
(-0.84) 
-0.101 
(-1.68)*** 
  
-0.765 
(-1.60) 
cons−  -1.614 
(-2.66)* 
-1.727 
(-2.41)** 
-7.99 
(-2.02)** 
-2.855 
(-2.04)** 
-3.194 
(-2.63)** 
Number of observation 540 527 483 523 527 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value) 0.025 0.022 0.006 0.017 0.032 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value) 0.600 0.462 0.255 0.378 0.517 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value) 0.593 0.636 0.467 0.402 0.587 
Wald test ( )0)log(: 10 =−tshadowH  (8.58)* (9.03)* (22.29)* (4.24)** (5.76)** 
Wald test ( )0:0 =DUMH  (2.90)*** (2.69)*** (7.59)* (11.78)* (4.32)** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
average of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption. 
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Table 4b: Effect of shadow economy on FDI, two step system GMM estimation 
(Robustness Checks) 
Dependent variable: ( )tFDIlog  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
( ) 1log −tFDI  0.633 
(4.13)* 
0.771 
(10.04)* 
0.804 
(9.66)* 
0.810 
(12.72)* 
0.773 
(9.26)* 
( ) 1log −tshadow  0.488 
(2.30)* 
0.395 
(2.03)* 
0.446 
(1. 93)*** 
0.342 
(2.00)** 
0.441 
(1.72)*** 
( )tgGDPlog   0.203 
(1.89)*** 
0.398 
(2.82)* 
0.249 
(2.21)** 
0.223 
(2.40)** 
teedomeconomicfr )log(    
-0.808 
(-0.76) 
  
( )tstabilityreedompoliticalf &log     -0.0007 
(-0.00) 
 
tefficincygovernment )log(      
-0.074 
(-0.33) 
)log(laborforce   
-0.258 
(-1.51) 
-0.385 
(-1.07) 
-0.226 
(-1.30) 
-0.332 
(-1.19) 
)log(HDI   
0.225 
(0.83) 
0.271 
(0.66) 
0.158 
(0.59) 
0.438 
(1.22) 
)log(investment   
0.069 
(0.21) 
-0.319 
(-0.64) 
-0.110 
(-0.34) 
0.102 
(0.27) 
)2002/2001(DUM  -0.216 
(-2.14)** 
-0.221 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.369 
(-3.15)* 
-0.243 
(-2.37)* 
-0.221 
(-1.89)*** 
)2003/2002(DUM  -0.152 
(-2.03)** 
    
)2004/2003(DUM  -0.032 
(-0.49) 
    
cons−  -1.43 
(-2.03)** 
2.353 
(0.99) 
8.374 
(1.19) 
2.469 
(0.88) 
3.413 
(0.81) 
Number of observation 513 481 450 479 481 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1), (p value) 0.022 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2), (p value) 0.522 0.539 0.414 0.501 0.543 
Hansen test of overid.  (p value) 0.583 0.441 0.578 0.606 0.346 
Wald test ( )0)log(: 10 =−tshadowH  (5.31)* (4.12)** (3.73)*** (4.00)** (2.95)*** 
Wald test ( )0:0 =DUMH  (2.99)** (3.53)*** (9.95)* (5.62)* (3.57)*** 
Notes: All models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond dynamic panel system GMM estimations 
(Stata xtabond2 command). Figures in the parentheses are t-statistics. * Significant at the 1 percent 
level, ** Significant at the 5 percent level and*** Significant at the 10 percent level. Political Freedom 
and Stability = average of voice & accountability and political stability. Government Efficiency = 
average of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption. 
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Table 5: Countries included in the Analysis 
ALBANIA ETHIOPIA MARSHALL ISLANDS SPAIN 
ALGERIA FIJI MAURITANIA SRI LANKA 
ANGOLA FINLAND MEXICO SWEDEN 
ARGENTINA FRANCE MICRONESIA SWITZERLAND 
ARMENIA GEORGIA MOLDOVA SYRIA 
AUSTRALIA GERMANY MONGOLIA TAIWAN 
AUSTRIA GHANA MOROCCO TANZANIA 
AZERBAIJAN GREECE MOZAMBIQUE THAILAND 
BANGLADESH GUATEMALA NAMIBIA TOGO 
BELARUS GUINEA NEPAL TONGA 
BELGIUM HAITI NETHERLANDS TUNISIA 
BENIN HONDURAS NEW ZEALAND TURKEY 
BHUTAN HONG KONG NICARAGUA UGANDA 
BOLIVIA HUNGARY NIGER UKRAINE 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA INDIA NIGERIA UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
BOTSWANA INDONESIA NORWAY UNITED KINGDOM 
BRAZIL IRAN OMAN UNITED STATES 
BULGARIA IRELAND PAKISTAN URUGUAY 
BURKINA FASO ISRAEL PALAU UZBEKISTAN 
BURUNDI ITALY PANAMA VANUATU 
CAMBODIA JAMAICA PAPUA NEW GUINEA VENEZUELA 
CAMEROON JAPAN PARAGUAY VIETNAM 
CANADA JORDAN PERU YEMEN 
CENTRAL AFRICAN  KAZAKHSTAN PHILIPPINES ZAMBIA 
CHAD KENYA POLAND ZIMBABWE 
CHILE KIRIBATI PORTUGAL  
CHINA KOREA, SOUTH PUERTO RICO  
COLOMBIA KUWAIT ROMANIA  
CONGO KYRGYZSTAN RUSSIA  
CONGO, Dem. Rep. LAOS RWANDA  
COSTA RICA LATVIA SAMOA  
COTE D'IVOIRE LEBANON SAUDI ARABIA  
CROATIA LESOTHO SENEGAL  
CZECH REPUBLIC LITHUANIA SERBIA  
DENMARK MACEDONIA SIERRA LEONE  
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC MADAGASCAR SINGAPORE  
ECUADOR MALAWI SLOVAKIA  
EGYPT MALAYSIA SLOVENIA  
EL SALVADOR MALDIVES SOLOMON ISLANDS  
ESTONIA MALI SOUTH AFRICA   
 
